Abstract:
The fall of the Shah of Iran in February 1979 brought to the fore long-standing dissatisfaction with the adequacy of US military power in the Persian Gulf region. Among military leaders and advisers there were two principal sources of concern: US capability to rapidly deploy military forces to the Gulf region, and the command arrangements for planning and executing combat operations in the region. Once the Shah was no longer available to act as regional "policeman" for US interests, defense officials began to consider ways to restructure planning and combat responsibilities for southwest Asia, and at the same time to build up rapid deployment forces with quick strike capabilities in the Gulf and elsewhere. This case provides background on the military command structure and Gulf security issues, and then follows the spirited debate that ensued within both the Carter and the Reagan administrations over how to allocate those command responsibilities. The case illustrates, first, the difficulty of deciding what military command arrangements are appropriate in an area of political controversy; and second, the difficulty of changing bureaucratic boundary lines and responsibilities in circumstances of contending institutional forces.
