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Abstract: The Gulf War--the US led effort to oust Iraq's armed forces from neighboring, oil-rich Kuwait--may be best remembered for the sheer effectiveness of the tactics and power which achieved the US military objectives in short order. But between the time of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the subsequent US-led counter-offensive, there ensued a series of delicate negotiations through which the Bush administration put together the political building blocks which allowed Operation Desert Storm to commence. This case is the first history focused specifically on the details and dynamics of those negotiations--with regional Arab powers, members of the UN Security Council and key members of Congress--and the variety of tactics which were employed. The case is based on original interviews with a number of key players, including then-Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney, US Ambassador to the United Nations Thomas Pickering, and National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft.
Learning Objective: This case is useful for those interested in negotiations theory, diplomacy and the politics of military interventions.