Abstract:
When Israel invaded Lebanon in June 1982, the United States became deeply involved: first by sending a special envoy to broker a withdrawal of PLO forces from Beirut (a withdrawal supervised in part by US marines); then by helping Christian strongman Bashir Gemayal win the presidency; finally, after Gemayal's assassination, by stationing marines in Beirut to bolster the Lebanese government while US diplomats pursued Lebanese-Israeli disengagement and the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Lebanon. At the same time, Lebanon became a key issue in broader US efforts to promote the regional peace process. Throughout this period different elements in the US government were at odds over a variety of policy questions: the pace and direction US-brokered negotiations should take; whether to pressure Israel to moderate its demands; whether and how US military power should bolster diplomatic efforts; and the degree to which the US should view the problem of Lebanon as a superpower confrontation.
Learning Objective:
This case relates the attitudes of different US officials and agencies on these and related issues, and describes how President Reagan, his cabinet, and the US foreign policy bureaucracy made the policy that guided US actions. It is intended to stimulate a discussion of the issues involved in supporting diplomacy with military power and of how the interests of US executive agencies shape policymaking.
