Abstract:
The abrupt disintegration in 1991 of the Soviet Union leads to accusations that the United States intelligence apparatus--the Central Intelligence Agency, in particular--had failed in its primary mission: to correctly assess the political, economic and military state of the USSR. This case, based on documents declassified specifically for the Kennedy School, traces the history of CIA intelligence estimates of the USSR from the end of the Brezhnev era to the coup attempt against Gorbachev. It examines not only the specifics of what the CIA was actually saying about the USSR but looks at the nature of the Agency's relationship with those holding political power and the ways in which the interests of policy officials made them more or less likely to heed intelligence estimates.
Learning Objective:
Ultimately, the case highlights the tension between the intelligence community, which seeks to inform, and policymakers, who would prefer such information to be supportive of US policy. Hitchner Case Prize Winner, 1994.
